Decline of the Seleucids: Macedonian Wars and Defeat By the Romans | Early European History And Religion

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MACEDONIAN WARS AND THE WEAKENING OF THE SELEUCID EMPIRE

Macedonian Wars and the Roman conquest of Greece

Roman control and influence in Greece increased beginning in the 3rd century B.C. The Romans destroyed the city of Corinth in 146 B.C. and sacked Athens in 86 B.C. In 48 B.C. a crucial battle in northern Greece known as the Battle of Pharsalus saw the army of Julius Caesar defeat a force led by Pompey; the victory resulted in Caesar becoming the de facto ruler of Rome. [Source Owen Jarus, Live Science June 3, 2022]

The Macedonian Wars (214–148 B.C.) were a series of conflicts fought by the Roman Republic and its Greek allies in the eastern Mediterranean against several different major Greek kingdoms, with the main one being Macedonia. They resulted in Roman control or influence over the eastern Mediterranean basin, in addition to their hegemony in the western Mediterranean after the Punic Wars. Traditionally, the "Macedonian Wars" include the four wars with Macedonia, in addition to one war with the Seleucid Empire, and a final minor war with the Achaean League (which is often considered to be the final stage of the final Macedonian war): 1) First Macedonian War (214 to 205 B.C.); 2) Second Macedonian war (200 to 196 B.C.); 3) Seleucid War (192 to 188 B.C.); 4) Third Macedonian War (172 to 168 B.C.); 5) Fourth Macedonian War (150 to 148 B.C.). [Source: Wikipedia +]

The most significant war was fought with the Seleucid Empire, while the war with Macedonia was the second, and both of these wars effectively marked the end of these empires as major world powers, even though neither of them led immediately to overt Roman domination. Four separate wars were fought against the weaker power, Macedonia, due to its geographic proximity to Rome, though the last two of these wars were against haphazard insurrections rather than powerful armies. Roman influence gradually dissolved Macedonian independence and digested it into what was becoming a leading global empire. The outcome of the war with the now-deteriorating Seleucid Empire was ultimately fatal to it as well, though the growing influence of Parthia and Pontus prevented any additional conflicts between it and Rome. +

“From the close of the Macedonian Wars until the early Roman Empire, the eastern Mediterranean remained an ever shifting network of polities with varying levels of independence from, dependence on, or outright military control by, Rome. According to Polybius, who sought to trace how Rome came to dominate the Greek east in less than a century, Rome's wars with Greece were set in motion after several Greek city-states sought Roman protection against the Macedonian Kingdom and Seleucid Empire in the face of a destabilizing situation created by the weakening of Ptolemaic Egypt. +

Historians see the growing Roman influence over the east, as with the west, not as a matter of intentional empire-building, but constant crisis management narrowly focused on accomplishing short-term goals within a highly unstable, unpredictable, and inter-dependent network of alliances and dependencies. With some major exceptions of outright military rule (such as parts of mainland Greece), the eastern Mediterranean world remained an alliance of independent city-states and kingdoms (with varying degrees of independence, both de jure and de facto) until it transitioned into the Roman Empire. It wasn't until the time of the Roman Empire that the eastern Mediterranean, along with the entire Roman world, was organized into provinces under explicit Roman control. +

Ancient Greek Control Over the Jews

In the late Fourth century B.C., Judea fell under the control of the Hellenistic (Greek) world. The Greeks concentrated temporal as well as religious power in the hands of the high priest. To ensure their control, the Greeks also established colonies throughout the vast area they came to control after Alexander the Great's conquests. [Source: Paul Mendes-Flohr Worldmark Encyclopedia of Religious Practices, 2000s Encyclopedia.com]

The Jews grew in strength throughout the 300 period after their exile, under the Persians and Greeks, despite their lands being ruled by foreign powers. At the same time they became more able to practice their faith freely, led by scribes and teachers who explained and interpreted the Bible.

333-63 B.C. Hellenistic (Greek) period.
333/331 B.C. Alexander the Great conquers the Land of Israel.
ca. 320-168 B.C. Judaism under Greek Ptolemies & Seleucids.
ca. 250 B.C. "Septuagint" translation of Torah into Greek.
ca. 230-146 B.C. Coming of Rome to the east Mediterranean.
ca. 201 B.C. Prophets (second division of Jewish Scriptures) recognized by some as Scripture
ca. 200 B.C.-135 C.E. Jewish Qumran community.
175 B.C. Selicid, king of Syria, plunders Jerusalem, murdering many.
166-160 B.C. Jewish Maccabean revolt against restrictions on practice of Judaism and desecration of the Temple.
142-129 B.C. Jewish autonomy under Hasmoneans.

Romans Take On Antiochus III, Ruler of Syria and the Seleucid Empire.

Philip V of Macedon

There was now left in the world only one great power which could claim to be a rival of Rome. That power was Syria, under its ambitious ruler, Antiochus III, 6th ruler of the Seleucid Empire. David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “A number of things led to the conflict between Rome and this great power in Asia. Rome and Flamininus did not deal so well with Antiochus on the diplomatic plane; he wanted the Romans to define the limits of his sphere of influence in Thrace, but they were unwilling or unable to do so. The senatorial treaty of 196 B.C. (ratifying the decision of Flamininus) had carried a not-so-subtle warning to Antiochus: all the Greeks states were to be free, without tribute or garrison, both in Europe and in Asia. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College ^*^]

“Flamininus was probably sincere in wanting to free the Greeks. Certainly the annalists made the most of the occasion of his proclamation (Livy 33.32 and 34.49). But trouble arose over the Roman settlement of the division of Thessaly, which had not been as favorable to the Aetolian League as it might have been, and in the Peloponnesus Flamininus had to stamp out the Spartan king Nabis, who had taken Argos. Still, when Flamininus said no garrison he meant Roman ones too, and in 194 he got his wish; over the protests of the Philhellenic (?) Scipio Africanus, who was in favor of making Greece a consular province, all the Roman forces were withdrawn. ^*^

“In 193-194 B.C. the Romans continued to negotiate with Antiochus to no avail. The Romans were prepared to let Antiochus keep Egypt and the rest of his empire if he got out of Thrace, but this proved unacceptable. In 193 B.C. the Aetolians, who had been dissatisfied with the settlement of 196, invited Antiochus to come in and liberate Greece. Antiochus was willing. He and the Aetolians looked for aid from Philip and from Hannibal, but both were still licking their wounds; in fact Philip had decided that for the moment his interests lay in remaining friends with Rome, and he provided assistance to Rome in the war against Antiochus (short of supplying troops). In Sparta old King Nabis was as ready as ever, though, and he managed to destroy a few towns before Flamininus put him down again in 192. The Aetolians subsequently managed to foment a plot in Sparta to kill Nabis, and also took the stronghold of Demetrias (another of the fetters of Greece).” ^*^

War with Antiochus of Syria (192-189 B.C.)

The direct cause of the War with Antiochus of Syria (192-189 B.C.) grew out of the intrigues of the Aetolians in Greece. This restless people stirred up a discord among the Greek cities, and finally called upon Antiochus to espouse their cause, and to aid them in driving the Romans out of the country. Antiochus accepted this invitation, crossed the Hellespont, and landed in Greece with an army of 10,000 men (192 B.C.). Rome now appeared as the protector of Europe against Asia. She was supported by her previous enemy, Philip of Macedonia; and she was also aided by the kingdom of Pergamum and the republic of Rhodes.[Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901), forumromanum.org \~]

David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “In the fall of 192 B.C. Antiochus was at Demetrias. Probably the most he hoped for was to make a quick show of force in Greece, then to retire on equal terms. But Rome responded with a declaration of war. Antiochus got no support in Greece except from the Aetolians, who had their eyes on Thessaly. In 191 B.C. a Roman army under M. Acilius Glabrio met Antiochus at Thermopylae, and repeated the tactic Xerxes had used in the late summer of 480; the key to the Roman victory was the weakness of the Aetolian contingent guarding the path against an encircling move. Antiochus' army was annihilated in the pass. Antiochus hastily retreated to Asia Minor, whither he was pursued by the Romans. The next few years in Greece saw the troublesome Aetolian League neutralized, bound by a treaty to preserve the empire and maiestas of the Roman people (189 B.C.). This treaty (Polybius 21.32 = SB 69) may be contrasted with the one made between Rome and the Aetolians in 201, when Rome required Aetolian help against Philip. Its relatively harsh terms are said to have been counter to the desires of Flamininus and reflective of the policies of Acilius Glabrio. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College]

Seleucid Empire

The career of Antiochus in Greece was short. After he was defeated by Marcus Porcius Cato in the famous pass of Thermopylae (191 B.C.), and was driven back across the sea into Asia Minor. A Roman fleet chased Antiochus into his home waters, bolstered by alliance with the Rhodians, whose navy was the envy of the Aegean. Why did the Romans take the war with Antiochus into the area of Asia Minor, which had never before been the scene of non-diplomatic Roman intervention? Surely one reason was to gratify Eumenes of Pergamum, who had succeeded to the throne of a very proud tradition (the Attalids) but whose lands and influence had been severely curtailed by the growth of Seleucid power. The Rhodians, whose fleet protected their brisk commerce in the eastern Mediterranean, also advocated putting Antiochus down. Less plausible is the motive adduced by Scullard, that Antiochus was seen as another Hannibal, and the pursuit to Asia Minor was simply the flip side of Scipio Africanus' strategy of taking the war to Hannibal in Africa. I knew Hannibal, Hannibal was a friend of mine, and believe me Antiochus was no Hannibal (á la Lloyd Bentsen); Antiochus posed no direct threat to Rome. Least effective as a motive here is the prospect of economic gain; the Romans were still hesitant about reaping the fruits of their intervention in Greece, and no one in 191 can have been thinking yet in terms of a province of Asia.

Romans Defeat Antiochus of Syria and the Seleucid Empire

David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “A series of naval battles saw the Romans temporarily in command of the seas. Meanwhile a Roman army was marching across Thrace. Its commander was officially L. Scipio, but at his side was his elder brother P. Scipio Africanus, calling the shots. Antiochus tried to negotiate, but the price demanded by the Romans, that he give up most of the Seleucid empire, was too high. The next year the Romans followed him, and fought their first battle upon the continent of Asia. The Roman army was nominally under the command of the new consul, L. Cornelius Scipio, but really under the command of his famous brother, Scipio Africanus, who accompanied him. The decisive battle was fought at Magnesia (190 B.C.), not far from Sardis in western Asia Minor. Forty thousand of the enemy were slain, with a comparatively small loss to the Romans. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College]

At the battle at Magnesia in 190 B.C., the Roman forces were outnumbered over 2 to 1, but despite heavy losses on their left flank to the Persian cavalry the Roman legions made short work of the Syrians in the center and the affair ended in Rome's favor. Had the settlement rested with the Scipios, Antiochus would have been left as a major power in the region and, incidentally, a stabilizing force. But the absence of the Scipios from Rome had exposed them to political attack, and their replacements in Asia Minor imposed such harsh terms upon Antiochus that a power vacuum was created in the Middle East.

After the great victory of Magnesia, Rome turned her arms against the Aetolians, who were so foolish as to continue the struggle. Their chief city, Ambracia, was taken; and they were soon forced to submit. Macedonia and all Greece, with the exception of the Achaean league, were now brought into subjection to the Roman authority. \~\

Reduction of the Seleucid Empire and Outcome of the War with Antiochus

Scipio imposed the terms of peace, which required Antiochus: 1) to give up all his possessions in Asia Minor—the most of which were added to the kingdom of Pergamum, with some territory to the republic of Rhodes; 2) to give up his fleet and not to interfere in European affairs; 3) to pay the sum of 15,000 talents (nearly $20,000,000) within twelve years; and 4) to surrender Hannibal, who had taken an active part in the war. [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901), forumromanum.org \~]

Roman Republic and Seleucid Empire

David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “The terms barred Antiochus from military activity west of the Taurus mountain range, effectively ejecting him from most of Turkey. Again, Gruen's method is to divine the original motive from the outcome; after Antiochus was defeated, the Romans parceled out his land between the Rhodians and Eumenes of Pergamum. Rhodes' tenure was destined to be short, however. In the years 169-167 a revolution at Rhodes brought an anti-Roman party to power, and even though the Rhodians tried to make amends after Roman supremacy was demonstrated yet again at Pydna, it was too late. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College ^*^]

“The Romans had demanded a huge indemnity from Antiochus (15,000 talents as against a mere 1000 from Philip in 196 B.C., 10,000 from Carthage in 202 B.C.). Bent on discrediting financial gain as a motive for Roman imperial conquests in this period, Gruen argues that such indemnities had two purposes: a) to reimburse Rome for the costs of the war, and b) to act as a punitive fine. Of course such sums could hardly be paid all at once, and installment schedules were devised. Perhaps it is a bit naive to insist that those who favored hunting Antiochus down so far from Italian soil had completely forgotten the lucrative legacy of the 2nd Punic War. But there is at least one seemingly telling point in Gruen's favor. In 191 B.C., the Carthaginians offered to pay off the balance of their ten thousand talent indemnity in a single lump sum (Livy 36.4); the Senate refused to allow this, which indicates that the symbolic importance of the annual monetary declaration of Carthaginian submission was paramount. Carthage is by any lights a special case, though, and humbling someone like Antiochus can not have been as crucial to Roman pride.

The Fate of Hannibal: To the Romans it seemed an act of treachery that Hannibal, who had been conquered in a fair field at Zama, should continue his hostility by fighting on the side of their enemies. But Hannibal never forgot the oath of eternal enmity to Rome, the oath which he had sworn at his father’s knee. When Antiochus agreed to surrender him, Hannibal fled to Crete, and afterward took refuge with the king of Bithynia. Here he continued his hostility to Rome by aiding this ruler in a war against Rome’s ally, the king of Pergamum. The Romans still pursued him, and sent Flamininus to demand his surrender. But Hannibal again fled, and, hunted from the face of the earth, this great soldier, who had been the most terrible foe that Rome had ever encountered, took his own life by drinking poison. It is said that the year of his death was the same year (183 B.C.) in which died his great and victorious antagonist, Scipio Africanus.” \~\

Silverman wrote: “In 146 B.C., Carthage and Corinth were both utterly destroyed. Macedonia and Africa were now provinces. In 133 Attalus III of Pergamum had died and tried to spare the Romans involvement in a war over his succession (there was no heir) by bequeathing his empire (in his will) to the Roman people. If so he failed, but a brief campaign in 131 and 130 was enough to settle the hash of Aristonicus, a pretender to his throne. The creation of a province of Asia followed in 130. Seleucid power was a thing of the past, and although two Ptolemies (VI and VII) were squabbling over Egypt and its vassals, the Romans simply left them to it. So the east was quiet. In the west, there was ongoing difficulty with the administration of Spain (Numantine War, 143-133), but no major threat prior to the war with Jugurtha (112-106). ^*^

Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean in 89 BC

Image Sources: Wikimedia Commons

Text Sources: Internet Ancient History Sourcebook: Greece sourcebooks.fordham.edu ; Internet Ancient History Sourcebook: Hellenistic World sourcebooks.fordham.edu ; BBC Ancient Greeks bbc.co.uk/history/; Canadian Museum of History, Perseus Project - Tufts University; perseus.tufts.edu ; MIT Classics Online classics.mit.edu ; Gutenberg.org, Metropolitan Museum of Art, National Geographic, Smithsonian magazine, New York Times, Washington Post, Live Science, Discover magazine, Natural History magazine, Archaeology magazine, The New Yorker, Encyclopædia Britannica, "The Discoverers" and "The Creators" by Daniel Boorstin. "Greek and Roman Life" by Ian Jenkins from the British Museum, Wikipedia, Reuters, Associated Press, The Guardian, AFP and various books and other publications.

Last updated September 2024