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ROMAN AMBITIONS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (200-133 B.C.)
The ambition and the resources of Rome were not exhausted with the conquest of Italy. It was a short distance from Italy to the Greek cities of Sicily and military power of Carthage across the Mediterranean in north Africa. When Rome launched a campaign to Sicily it set in motion a series of events that lasted over a hundred years and did not end until Rome controlled the Mediterranean and was a major world power. The strength and skill that Rome had acquired in its wars with the Latins, Etruscans and Samnites, were now put to use in greater conflicts with more at stake in Carthage, Macedonia and Syria. [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) \~]
David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “Roman intervention across the Adriatic began in Illyria, with the suppression of organized piracy connived at by Queen Teuta (Polybius 2. 2-12). In 229 a consular army went over and established a protectorate on the east side of the straight of Otranto (thus over Corcyra, Apollonia, Dyrrhachium, and Issa). This involved no formal treaties or formal obligations on either side; no Roman garrisons, no tribute to be paid. However, it did involve a commitment of Roman fides (trust), and the senate sent envoys to report the success to major Hellenic centers such as Athens and Corinth. Most scholars, following Holleaux, think that there was nothing actively or aggressively imperialistic about this (this is the line taken by Carey & Scullard). But a few (Hammond and Harris) are prepared to see a first step consciously taken in the direction of dominion over the east. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College]
Websites on Ancient Rome: Internet Ancient History Sourcebook: Rome sourcebooks.fordham.edu ; Internet Ancient History Sourcebook: Late Antiquity sourcebooks.fordham.edu ; BBC Ancient Rome bbc.co.uk/history; Perseus Project - Tufts University; perseus.tufts.edu ; Lacus Curtius penelope.uchicago.edu; The Internet Classics Archive classics.mit.edu ; Bryn Mawr Classical Review bmcr.brynmawr.edu; Cambridge Classics External Gateway to Humanities Resources web.archive.org; Ancient Rome resources for students from the Courtenay Middle School Library web.archive.org ; History of ancient Rome OpenCourseWare from the University of Notre Dame web.archive.org ; United Nations of Roma Victrix (UNRV) History unrv.com; Internet Ancient History Sourcebook Hellenistic World sourcebooks.fordham.edu ; Illustrated Greek History, Dr. Janice Siegel, Hampden–Sydney College hsc.edu/drjclassics ; Ancient Greek Sites on the Web from Medea showgate.com/medea ; Greek History Course from Reed web.archive.org
Eastern Mediterranean in the 3rd and 2nd Centuries B.C.
“The Divisions of the Empire of Alexander: At the time of the second Punic war, the countries about the Mediterranean may be considered as forming two distinct worlds: the Western world, in which Rome and Carthage were struggling for mastery; and the Eastern world, which was divided among the successors of Alexander the Great. It was more than a century before this time that Alexander had built up a great empire, extending from Greece to the middle of Asia. By his conquests the ideals of Greek art and literature and philosophy had been spread into the eastern countries. But Alexander had none of the genius for organization which the Romans possessed, and so at his death his empire fell to pieces. The fragments were seized by his different generals, and became new and distinct kingdoms. At this time there were three of these kingdoms which were quite extensive and powerful. These were: 1) the kingdom of Egypt under the Ptolemies, in Africa; 2) the kingdom of Syria under the Seleucidae, in Asia; and 3) the kingdom of Macedonia under the direct successors of Alexander, in southeastern Europe. [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) \~]
Egypt under the Ptolemies: Under the reign of the Ptolemies, Egypt had attained a remarkable degree of prosperity. Her territory not only included the valley of the Nile, but extended into Asia, taking in Palestine, Phoenicia, and the southern part of Syria (Coele-Syria), besides Cyprus and some other islands. Its capital, Alexandria, was perhaps the most cultivated city of the world, where the learned men of all countries found their home. So devoted was Egypt to the arts of peace, that she kept aloof, as far as possible, from the great wars of this period. But she was an object of envy to the kings of Syria and Macedonia; and toward the close of the second Punic war, in order to protect herself, she had formed an alliance with Rome. The friendly relations between Rome and Egypt were preserved, while Rome carried on war with the other great powers of the East. \~\
Syria under Antiochus III: The most important fragment of Alexander’s empire in Asia was Syria, or the kingdom of the Seleucidae—so called from the name of its founder, Seleucus the Conqueror. It covered a large part of western Asia, comprising the valley of the Euphrates, upper Syria, and portions of Asia Minor. Its rulers included four kings by the name of Seleucus, and eight by the name of Antiochus. These names also appear in the capital cities of the Syrian empire, Seleucia on the Tigris and Antioch in upper Syria. The most powerful of these kings was Antiochus III., surnamed the Great. He did much to enlarge and strengthen the empire. But he incurred the hostility of Rome by giving asylum to Rome’s great enemy, Hannibal, and also by attempting to make conquests in Europe. There were a few small states in Asia Minor, like Pergamum, Bithynia, Pontus, and the island republic of Rhodes, which were not included in the kingdom of Syria and which were inclined to look to Rome for protection. \~\
Macedonia and the Greek Cities: The third great fragment of Alexander’s empire was Macedonia, which aspired to be supreme in eastern Europe. A part of Greece fell under its authority. But many of the Greek cities remained free; and they united into leagues or confederations, in order to maintain their independence. One of these was the Achaean league, made up of the cities of southern Greece, or the Peloponnesus; and another was the Aetolian league, including a large number of cities in central Greece. When Philip V. came to the throne of Macedonia, his kingdom was in a flourishing condition. The young ruler was ambitious to extend his power; and came into hostile relations with Rome, which espoused the cause of the Greek cities. \~\
Decline and Legacy of the Greeks
Weakened by feuds between rival city states and threat from Carthage and Rome, the Greek colonies eventually were conquered by the Romans in the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C., but Greek cultures, customs and language lasted for centuries more.When Mount Vesuvius erupted in A.D. 79, most people in Naples still spoke Greek as their first language
Athens’ domination of ancient Greece was effectively ended by the Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.), which resulted in Spartan hegemony over Athens and its allies. In 371 B.C., the Spartans suffered a disastrous defeat to the Thebes at the Battle of Leuctra. The Spartans never recovered from the blow this disaster gave to their prestige. It was poetic justice that this punishment for their ill rule should come from Thebes — the city they had used shamefully beyond all others. During the rule of Philip of Macedon (reigned 359 to 336 B.C.) and Alexander the Great (356 to 324 B.C.) Macedonia and its Greek allies were the preeminent power in Greece and, under Alexander, the eastern Mediterranean. In contrast to the western Mediterranean, the Greek east had been dominated by major empires for centuries, and Roman influence and alliance-seeking led to wars with these empires that further weakened them and therefore created an unstable power vacuum that only Rome was capable of pacifying.
In 146 B.C. the Romans destroyed Carthage and Corinth, the home of the last Greek league of cities that had tried to resist Roman expansion. Under the command of Roman consul Lucius Mummius Corinthian men were slaughtered, women and children were sold into slavery, art was shipped back to Rome and Corinth was turned into a ghost town.
Ancient Greece is still very close to use today. Many of are buildings are constructed to look like Greek temples, our coins have changed little in design since Greek coins, our comedies are based as many of the same kind of jokes used in Greek plays and some of our greatest sporting events are modeled on ancient Greek games. [Source: "History of Art" by H.W. Janson, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J."
People on the isolated village of Ólimbos speak a Greek dialect that is so old some of the words date back to Homer's time. Their musical instruments include goatskin bagpipes and the three stringed lyre. The tools they use to cultivate wheat and barley are the same as those used by the Byzantines.
Polybius: Roman Versus Macedonian-Greek Military Tactics
Polybius (ca. 200-118 B.C.) was a Greek historian of the Hellenistic period noted for his work “The Histories,” which covered the period of 264–146 B.C., when the Roman Republic became dominant power in the ancient Mediterranean world. In a section that addressed “The Roman Maniple vs. The Macedonian Phalanx,” Polybius wrote in Book XVIII, Chapters 28-32 of “The Histories”: “In former times the Macedonian tactics proved themselves by experience capable of conquering those of Asia and Greece; while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the nations of Africa and all those of Western Europe; and since in our own day there have been numerous opportunities of comparing the men as well as their tactics, it will be, I think, a useful and worthy task to investigate their differences, and discover why it is that the Romans conquer and carry off the palm from their enemies in the operations of war: that we may not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their good luck, as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a knowledge of the true causes, may give their leaders the tribute of praise and admiration which they deserve. [Source: Polybius,”The Histories of Polybius”, 2 Vols., translated by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (London: Macmillan, 1889), pp. 226-230]
“Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not owing to their arms or their tactics, but to the skill and genius of Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made quite clear in my account of the battles themselves. And my contention is supported by two facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability comparable with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms of his men, and having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with the arms of the Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end. Pyrrhus, again, availed himself not only of the arms, but also of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a company of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against the Romans. Yet even this did not enable him to win; the battles were somehow or another always indecisive. It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate any instances which might seem to make against my theory. I will now return to my comparison.
Greek-Macedonian Phalanx Versus Roman Military Formations
Polybius wrote in Book XVIII, Chapters 28-32 of “The Histories”: “Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the phalanx has its proper formation and strength, nothing can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a man in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the sarissae are sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank will have their sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the description in Homer: ‘So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm; And man on man; and waving horse-hair plumes In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed In order: in such serried rank they stood. [Iliad, 13.131] [Source: Polybius,”The Histories of Polybius”, 2 Vols., translated by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (London: Macmillan, 1889), pp. 226-230]
“And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits. With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the heads of the whole phalanx; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, however, during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight of their bodies; and thus make the charge very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about. “Such is the arrangement, general and detailed of the phalanx.
It remains now to compare with it the peculiarities and distinctive features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman soldier in full armor also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man---because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing---it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily---seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigor to the use of their swords. Therefore, it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength.”
Greek phalanx
Superiority of Roman Tactics
Polybius wrote in Book XVIII, Chapters 28-32 of “The Histories”: “Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. [Source: Polybius,”The Histories of Polybius”, 2 Vols., translated by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (London: Macmillan, 1889), pp. 226-230]
“However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but maneuvers for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.
“For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts. The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course, those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately.
“The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well-equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.”
Roman defense
Macedonian Wars
The Macedonian Wars (214–148 B.C.). The Macedonian Wars were a series of conflicts fought by the Roman Republic and its Greek allies in the eastern Mediterranean against several different major Greek kingdoms, with the main one being Macedonia. They resulted in Roman control or influence over the eastern Mediterranean basin, in addition to their hegemony in the western Mediterranean after the Punic Wars. Traditionally, the "Macedonian Wars" include the four wars with Macedonia, in addition to one war with the Seleucid Empire, and a final minor war with the Achaean League (which is often considered to be the final stage of the final Macedonian war): 1) First Macedonian War (214 to 205 B.C.); 2) Second Macedonian war (200 to 196 B.C.); 3) Seleucid War (192 to 188 B.C.); 4) Third Macedonian War (172 to 168 B.C.); 5) Fourth Macedonian War (150 to 148 B.C.). [Source: Wikipedia +]
The most significant war was fought with the Seleucid Empire, while the war with Macedonia was the second, and both of these wars effectively marked the end of these empires as major world powers, even though neither of them led immediately to overt Roman domination. Four separate wars were fought against the weaker power, Macedonia, due to its geographic proximity to Rome, though the last two of these wars were against haphazard insurrections rather than powerful armies. Roman influence gradually dissolved Macedonian independence and digested it into what was becoming a leading global empire. The outcome of the war with the now-deteriorating Seleucid Empire was ultimately fatal to it as well, though the growing influence of Parthia and Pontus prevented any additional conflicts between it and Rome. + According to Encyclopaedia Britannica The First Macedonian War (215–205 B.C.) occurred in the context of the Second Punic War, while Rome was preoccupied with fighting Carthage. The ambitious Macedonian king Philip V set out to attack Rome’s client states in neighbouring Illyria and confirmed his purpose in 215 B.C. by making an alliance with Hannibal of Carthage against Rome. The Romans fought the ensuing war ineffectively, and in 205 B.C. the Peace of Phoenice ended the conflict on terms favourable to Philip, allowing him to keep his conquests in Illyria. [Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica ++]
“Philip then began harrying Rhodes, Pergamum, and other Greek city-states of the Aegean. The Second Macedonian War (200–196 B.C.) was launched by the Roman Senate against Philip after he refused to guarantee to make no hostile moves against these states. Philip’s forces were badly defeated by the Romans and their Greek allies in a battle at Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C.. The terms of peace included the loss of most of his navy, payment of a large indemnity to Rome, and the loss of his territories outside of Macedonia. Rome subsequently established a benevolent protectorate over Greece. ++
“Philip’s son and successor, Perseus (reigned 179–168 B.C.), began to make alliances with various Greek city-states and thus aroused the displeasure of Rome. So began the Third Macedonian War (171–168 B.C.), which ended in 168 when the Roman army of Lucius Aemilius Paullus utterly defeated Perseus’ forces at the Battle of Pydna. Perseus was taken back to Rome in chains, and Macedonia was broken up into four formally autonomous republics that were required to pay annual tribute to Rome. This arrangement produced a state of chronic disorder in Macedonia, however, and in 152 B.C. a pretended son of Perseus, Andriscus, tried to reestablish the Macedonian monarchy, thus provoking the Fourth Macedonian War (149–148 B.C.). The Roman praetor Quintus Caecilius Metellus crushed the rebellion with relative ease, and in 146 Macedonia was made a Roman province. It was in fact the first province of the nascent Roman Empire.” ++
“From the close of the Macedonian Wars until the early Roman Empire, the eastern Mediterranean remained an ever shifting network of polities with varying levels of independence from, dependence on, or outright military control by, Rome. According to Polybius, who sought to trace how Rome came to dominate the Greek east in less than a century, Rome's wars with Greece were set in motion after several Greek city-states sought Roman protection against the Macedonian Kingdom and Seleucid Empire in the face of a destabilizing situation created by the weakening of Ptolemaic Egypt. +
Historians see the growing Roman influence over the east, as with the west, not as a matter of intentional empire-building, but constant crisis management narrowly focused on accomplishing short-term goals within a highly unstable, unpredictable, and inter-dependent network of alliances and dependencies. With some major exceptions of outright military rule (such as parts of mainland Greece), the eastern Mediterranean world remained an alliance of independent city-states and kingdoms (with varying degrees of independence, both de jure and de facto) until it transitioned into the Roman Empire. It wasn't until the time of the Roman Empire that the eastern Mediterranean, along with the entire Roman world, was organized into provinces under explicit Roman control. +
Why did Rome go to War with Macedonia?
David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “Why did Rome go to war with Philip? Various theories have been offered. It is convenient to represent them schematically, but still be aware that most accounts are not fixated upon a single cause. The complaints of the Athenians have already been mentioned; for the annalistic tradition that, coupled with the sentimental regard for Athens as the repository of past glory and present center of learning, is one of the major causes. It need not be totally discounted, but one sign of the concern to emphasize this cause is that the annalists multiplied embassies from the Athenians, something which does not inspire confidence. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College ^*^]
“Another seemingly plausible cause is Roman desire to get revenge on Philip for supporting Hannibal during the 2nd Punic War, and sheltering him after it. That support, however, had amounted to nothing in practical terms, and we should resist the temptation to ascribe deliberate policy decisions to such a personal and petty motivation (compare the "wrath of the Barcids" theory). Livy also mentions the violation of some unnamed "allies" of Rome by Philip; their very namelessness is a clear enough indication that they are an invention of the annalistic tradition .g. Livy 30.42). More weighty is the threat to Egypt from the secret pact between Philip and Antiochus, emphasized by Holleaux, propagated in the textbook, and partially upheld by Walbank (1963). Gruen's objection is that the senate and people of Rome had plenty of time to perceive that the cooperation between Macedonia and Syria, rivals during most of the last 100 years, was largely ineffectual. His own solution, however, is scarcely more satisfying. He stresses the reluctance of the Roman ambassadors to communicate an ultimatum to Philip, and indeed they seem to have scuttled around Greece and the Aegean for about a year before they finally did so. He also points out that the initial demands of the Romans were lenient: Philip was to keep his power in Macedon and Thrace, but cease aggressive actions (especially against Egypt) and submit territorial disputes to arbitration in the time-honored Greek way. ^*^
“Gruen's true cause, then, is miscommunication: the Romans were reluctantly drawn into the war because Philip had been supposed to back down but did not. Roman pride was therefore at stake. Unfortunately, if we are willing to dismiss Philhellenism on the grounds that it is not concrete enough, is not the Roman pride theory subject to the same critique? One may well prefer Walbank or Scullard's more cautious brand of "defensive imperialism", whereby the real motive was that the senators could see trouble with Antiochus coming down the road and wanted to establish a protectorate in Greece, both for the sake of the Greeks (for whom they truly did have a soft spot) and as a buffer against Antiochus. The aggressive imperialism hypothesis also has a lot of weight. Livy 31. 1-7 mentions, in the context of the decision to go to war, that portents had signified an expansion of Rome's frontiers. Harris argues that Rome had ensured that war would come when she accepted the amicitia of Athens and Attalus, and that the fear of Philip (which is a pillar of the defensive imperialism theory) can not be true, because Philip's navy was too weak to invade Italy.” ^*^
Why Didn't Alexander the Great Invade Rome?
Owen Jarus wrote in Live Science: Alexander the Great conquered a massive empire that stretched from the Balkans to modern-day Pakistan. But if the Macedonian king had turned his attention westward, it's possible he would have conquered Rome, too, feasibly smiting the Roman Empire before it had a chance to arise. So why didn't Alexander the Great try to conquer Italy? The answer may be that he died before he got the chance. [Source: Owen Jarus, Live Science, November 25, 2023]
Had he not died, however, it's possible that Alexander would have targeted Rome and, with his substantial forces, defeated the Eternal City. Some ancient texts suggest that Alexander the Great was planning a military campaign in the West that involved conquering parts of Italy, among other locations along the Mediterranean. The Roman historian Quintus Curtius Rufus, who lived in the first century A.D., claimed that Alexander the Great had planned a series of conquests that, if successful, would have expanded his empire all the way to what is now the Strait of Gibraltar. Alexander planned to build 700 ships to support this invasion, Rufus noted. Other ancient writers made similar claims. "The Romans were convinced that Alexander would have attempted the conquest of Rome, but for modern historians, it is impossible to say," Nikolaus Overtoom, an associate professor of history at Washington State University.
Some ancient writers claimed that after Alexander died, his secretary, Eumenes, gave one of Alexander's senior generals, Perdiccas, plans that included the conquest of part of Italy, Robin Waterfield, an independent scholar with a background in classics, t. "Now, some scholars believe that the [plans] are not genuine — perhaps a forgery by Eumenes, or perhaps the whole story arose years, even decades later," Waterfield said. However, "I think the balance of evidence is that they're genuine."
It's ultimately unclear what would have happened if Alexander the Great had tried to invade Italy. The Romans were so strongly convinced that Alexander would have attempted the invasion that the historian Livy (lived circa 59 B.C. to A.D. 17) wrote a text speculating how the invasion would have ended, with Livy predicting that the Romans would have defeated Alexander. Livy noted that Alexander's uncle, Alexander I of Epirus, who ruled a kingdom of the same name, tried to conquer part of Italy but was killed in battle in 331 B.C.
Waterfield noted that descriptions of Alexander's plans indicate he would have invaded other locations in the Mediterranean before landing on the Italian mainland. This suggests that Alexander's forces would have been overwhelming, even if the Romans had any allies in their fight against him. "By the time he reached Italy and faced the Roman Republic he would have had the resources of the entire Mediterranean at his command — a vast mercenary army, and he'd have commanded all the supply routes," Waterfield said. The "only thing that could have stopped him was internal rebellion or mutiny by his Macedonian troops."
Philip Freeman, a humanities professor at Pepperdine University in California, said that if Alexander had invaded Italy, he likely would have succeeded, noting that there were a number of Greek colonies in Italy that might have supported Alexander's rule. "The Romans were tough and would have resisted, but they were not yet the powerful force of later centuries," Freeman t. "If Alexander had invaded, I think there would have been no Roman Empire since Roman power would have been nipped in the bud, so to speak."
Italy and Macedonia at the time of the Second Punic War (218-201 BC)
First Macedonian War (215-206 B.C.)
An indiscreet alliance between Philip V of Macedon (one of the three great powers which emerged from the breakup of the empire of Alexander the Great after his death in 323) and the great Carthage general Hannibal, during the second Punic war, that brought about the first conflict between Rome and Macedonia. But Rome was then so fully occupied with her struggle with Carthage that all she desired to do was simply to prevent Philip from making his threatened invasion of Italy. Rome therefore sent a small force across the Adriatic, made friends with the Aetolians, and kept Philip occupied at home. The Macedonian king was thus prevented from sending any force into Italy. The Aetolians, not satisfied with the support given to them by Rome, soon made peace with Philip; and the Romans themselves, who were about to invade Africa, were also willing to conclude a treaty of peace with him. Thus closed what is generally called the first Macedonian war, which was really nothing more than a diversion to prevent Philip from giving aid to Hannibal after the battle of Cannae. [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) \~]
David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “During the 2nd Punic War, in 215 B.C.,Philip V of Macedon had made an alliance with Hannibal. Polybius quotes the terms of the treaty between them (Polyb. 7.9). Rome sent a small fleet, commanded by a praetor, to protect Illyria. The praetor, Laevinus, formed a strategic alliance with the Aetolian League in 211. This alliance, which is partially extant on stone (SB I 66) is the earliest formal alliance between Rome and Greeks. Gruen, who is fighting a rearguard action against the proponents of active imperialism, insists that the alliance was intended to be temporary. But take note, as Harris does, of the booty provision. In any case, other Greeks quickly joined up and Philip was preventing from providing any aid to Hannibal by a war on his own home front. Among Rome's new allies was Attalus of Pergamum, who earlier had shown his hostility to Philip and Macedon by contributing money to the Aetolian League. Eventually, hard pressed by Hannibal in Italy, the Romans lost interest in the war in Greece and went home; Attalus withdrew his forces in 208 B.C. and the Aetolians made peace with Philip in 206. Some belated Roman attempts to stir up trouble came to nothing, so the Romans made their own peace with Philip (the Peace of Phoenice, in 205 B.C.). [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College]
See Separate Article: FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR (215-206 B.C.) europe.factsanddetails.com
Second Macedonian War (200-197 B.C.)
“Beginning of the Second Macedonian War: When the second Punic war was fairly ended, Rome felt free to deal with Philip of Macedonia, and to take a firm hand in settling the affairs of the East. Philip had annoyed her, not only by making an alliance with Hannibal, but afterward by sending a force to assist him at the battle of Zama. And now the ambitious schemes of Philip were not at all to the liking of Rome. For instance, he made an agreement with Antiochus of Syria to cut up the possessions of Egypt, a country which was friendly to Rome. He was also overrunning the coasts of the Aegean Sea, and was threatening the little kingdom of Pergamum in Asia Minor, and the little republic of Rhodes, as well as the cities of Greece. When appeal came to Rome for protection, she espoused the cause of the small states, and declared war against Macedonia. The great hero of this war was T. Quinctius Flamininus; and the decisive battle was fought near a hill in Thessaly called Cynoscephalae (Dog’s Heads). Here Philip was completely defeated, and his army was destroyed. Although Macedonia was not reduced to the condition of a province, it became practically subject to Rome. Macedonia was thus humbled, and there was no other power in Europe to dispute the supremacy of Rome. [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) \~]
Macedonia and an eastern Mediterranean in 200 BC
David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “Philip's strategy was to wage a slow, defensive war, avoiding major battles and continually dividing and re-combining his forces. In the fall of 200 Sulpicius invaded Macedonia and gained the support of the Aetolian League; but Philip held on and retained his alliance with the Achaean League. Sulpicius' replacement, T. Quinctius Flamininus, was in a position to demand Philip's surrender in the spring of 198 B.C.. He offered Philip the opportunity to stay in power, if he agreed to give up any claims upon the rest of Greece. Philip might have agreed to let go of Aetolia, Boeotia and points south, but he could not swallow the demand to surrender Thessaly, which had a long history of close association with the Macedonian kings; so negotiations broke down. Flamininus and the Aetolians were next able to cut Philip off and take Thessaly. This success convinced the Achaean League to throw in its lot with the Romans, but the League was unable to deliver its own headquarters at Corinth, which had been a Macedonian stronghold in its capacity as one of the three fetters of Greece ever since 338 B.C. The status of these three towns (Corinth, Demetrias, and Chalkis) was a cause for special concern because they symbolized the legacy of Macedonian domination (cf. Livy 33. 31). The event may not have been totally forgotten when Corinth was razed to the ground in 146 B.C. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College ^*^]
See Separate Article: SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR (200-197 B.C.) europe.factsanddetails.com
Third Macedonian War (171-168 B.C.)
“Beginning of the Third Macedonian War: Philip of Macedonia had been a faithful ally of Rome during the late war with Antiochus; but at its close he felt that he had not been sufficiently rewarded for his fidelity. He saw that the little states of Pergamum and Rhodes had received considerable accessions to their territories, while he himself was apparently forgotten. On account of this seeming neglect, he began to think of regaining his old power. When he died, he was succeeded by his son, Perseus, who continued the design of making Macedonia free from the dictation of Rome. Perseus did what he could to develop the resources of his kingdom, and to organize and strengthen his army. He even began to be looked upon by the Greek cities as their champion against the encroachments of Rome. But the time soon came when he was obliged to answer for his arrogant conduct. The Romans became convinced of the ambitious scheme of Perseus, and entered upon a new war against Macedonia. [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) \~]
Battle of Pydna (168 B.C.): After three unsuccessful campaigns, the Romans finally placed in command of their army an able general, Aemilius Paullus, the son of the consul who was slain at Cannae. The two armies met near Pydna,, and Perseus suffered a crushing defeat. Here the Macedonian phalanx fought its last great battle, and the Roman legions gave a new evidence of their superior strength. Twenty thousand Macedonians were slain, and eleven thousand were captured. It is said that the spoils of this battle were so great that the citizens of Rome were henceforth relieved from the payment of taxes. Paullus received at Rome the most magnificent triumph that had ever been seen. For three days the gorgeous procession marched through the streets of Rome, bearing the trophies of the East. Through the concourse of exultant people was driven the chariot of the defeated king of Macedonia, followed by the victorious army adorned with laurels, and its successful commander decked with the insignia of Jupiter Capitolinus, with a laurel branch in his hand. \~\
The Settlement of Macedonia: The question now arose as to what should be done with Macedonia, which had so many times resisted the Roman power. The Romans were not yet ready to reduce the country to a province, and were not willing to have it remain independent. It was therefore split up into four distinct republics, which were to be entirely separated from one another, but which were to be dependent upon Rome. With a show of generosity, Rome compelled the people to pay as tribute only half of what had been previously paid to the Macedonian king. But the republics could have no relations with one another, either by way of commerce or intermarriage. All the chief men of Greece who had given any aid to the Macedonian king were transported to Italy, where they could not stir up a revolt in their native country. Among these Achaean captives was the famous historian, Polybius, who during this time gathered the materials of his great work on Roman history. \~\
See Separate Article: THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR (171-168 B.C.) europe.factsanddetails.com
Romans Take Over Macedonia and Greece
The Greek peninsula first came under Roman rule in 146 B.C. after the Battle of Corinth when Macedonia became a Roman province, while southern Greece came under the surveillance of Macedonia's prefect. However, some Greek poleis managed to maintain partial independence and avoid taxation. The Kingdom of Pergamon was in principle added to this territory in 133 B.C. when King Attalus III left his territories to the Roman people in his will. However, the Romans were slow in securing their claim and Aristonicus led a revolt with the help of Blossius. This was put down in 129 BC, when Pergamon was divided among Rome, Pontus, and Cappadocia. [Source: Wikipedia +]
Athens and other Greek cities revolted in 88 B.C. and the uprising was crushed by the Roman general Sulla. The Roman civil wars devastated the land even further, until Augustus organized the peninsula as the province of Achaea in 27 B.C. +
Greece, initially economically devastated, began to rise economically after the wars. The Greek cities of Asia Minor recovered more quickly at first than the cities on the Greek peninsula, which were heavily damaged by the forces of Sulla. The Romans invested heavily however, and rebuilt these cities. Corinth became the capital of the new province of Achaea, while Athens prospered as a center of philosophy and learning. +
expansion of the Roman Empire between 200 and 117 BC
Greek Influences on Rome
Arguable the most powerful foreign influence on Rome came from Greece. We might say that when Greece was conquered by Rome, Rome was civilized by Greece. These foreign influences were seen in her new ideas of religion and philosophy, in her literature, her art, and her manners. [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) \~]
It is said that the entire Greek Olympus was introduced into Italy. The Romans adopted the Greek ideas and stories regarding the gods; and their worship became more showy and elaborate. Even some of the superstitious and fantastic rites of Asia found their way into Rome. These changes did not improve the religion. On the contrary, they made it more corrupt. The Roman religion, by absorbing the various ideas of other people, became a world-wide and composite form of paganism. One of the redeeming features of the Roman religion was the worship of exalted qualities, like Honor and Virtue; for example, alongside of the temple to Juno, temples were also erected to Loyalty and Hope. \~\
Roman Philosophy: The more educated Romans lost their interest in religion, and betook themselves to the study of Greek philosophy. They studied the nature of the gods and the moral duties of men. In this way the Greek ideas of philosophy found their way into Rome. Some of these ideas, like those of the Stoics, were elevating, and tended to preserve the simplicity and strength of the old Roman character. But other ideas, like those of the Epicureans, seemed to justify a life of pleasure and luxury. \~\
Roman Literature: Before the Romans came into contact with the Greeks, they cannot be said to have had anything which can properly be called a literature. They had certain crude verses and ballads; but it was the Greeks who first taught them how to write. It was not until the close of the first Punic war, when the Greek influence became strong, that we begin to find the names of any Latin authors. The first author, Andronicus, who is said to have been a Greek slave, wrote a Latin poem in imitation of Homer. Then came Naevius, who combined a Greek taste with a Roman spirit, and who wrote a poem on the first Punic war; and after him, Ennius, who taught Greek to the Romans, and wrote a great poem on the history of Rome, called the “Annals.” The Greek influence is also seen in Plautus and Terence, the greatest writers of Roman comedy; and in Fabius Pictor, who wrote a history of Rome, in the Greek language. \~\
As for art, while the Romans could never hope to acquire the pure aesthetic spirit of the Greeks, they were inspired with a passion for collecting Greek works of art, and for adorning their buildings with Greek ornaments. They imitated the Greek models and professed to admire the Greek taste; so that they came to be, in fact, the preservers of Greek art. \~\
Image Sources: Wikimedia Commons
Text Sources: Internet Ancient History Sourcebook: Rome sourcebooks.fordham.edu ; Internet Ancient History Sourcebook: Late Antiquity sourcebooks.fordham.edu ; “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) ; “The Private Life of the Romans” by Harold Whetstone Johnston, Revised by Mary Johnston, Scott, Foresman and Company (1903, 1932); BBC Ancient Rome bbc.co.uk/history/ ; Project Gutenberg gutenberg.org ; Metropolitan Museum of Art, National Geographic, Smithsonian magazine, New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Live Science, Discover magazine, Archaeology magazine, Reuters, Associated Press, The Guardian, AFP, The New Yorker, Wikipedia, Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopedia.com and various other books, websites and publications.
Last updated October 2024