Second Macedonian War (200-197 B.C.) and the Defeat of the Seleucid Empire | Early European History And Religion

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SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR

Antiochos III

“Beginning of the Second Macedonian War: When the second Punic war was fairly ended, Rome felt free to deal with Philip of Macedonia, and to take a firm hand in settling the affairs of the East. Philip had annoyed her, not only by making an alliance with Hannibal, but afterward by sending a force to assist him at the battle of Zama. And now the ambitious schemes of Philip were not at all to the liking of Rome. For instance, he made an agreement with Antiochus of Syria to cut up the possessions of Egypt, a country which was friendly to Rome. He was also overrunning the coasts of the Aegean Sea, and was threatening the little kingdom of Pergamum in Asia Minor, and the little republic of Rhodes, as well as the cities of Greece. When appeal came to Rome for protection, she espoused the cause of the small states, and declared war against Macedonia. The great hero of this war was T. Quinctius Flamininus; and the decisive battle was fought near a hill in Thessaly called Cynoscephalae (Dog’s Heads). Here Philip was completely defeated, and his army was destroyed. Although Macedonia was not reduced to the condition of a province, it became practically subject to Rome. Macedonia was thus humbled, and there was no other power in Europe to dispute the supremacy of Rome. [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) \~]

David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “Philip's strategy was to wage a slow, defensive war, avoiding major battles and continually dividing and re-combining his forces. In the fall of 200 Sulpicius invaded Macedonia and gained the support of the Aetolian League; but Philip held on and retained his alliance with the Achaean League. Sulpicius' replacement, T. Quinctius Flamininus, was in a position to demand Philip's surrender in the spring of 198 B.C.. He offered Philip the opportunity to stay in power, if he agreed to give up any claims upon the rest of Greece. Philip might have agreed to let go of Aetolia, Boeotia and points south, but he could not swallow the demand to surrender Thessaly, which had a long history of close association with the Macedonian kings; so negotiations broke down. Flamininus and the Aetolians were next able to cut Philip off and take Thessaly. This success convinced the Achaean League to throw in its lot with the Romans, but the League was unable to deliver its own headquarters at Corinth, which had been a Macedonian stronghold in its capacity as one of the three fetters of Greece ever since 338 B.C. The status of these three towns (Corinth, Demetrias, and Chalkis) was a cause for special concern because they symbolized the legacy of Macedonian domination (cf. Livy 33. 31). The event may not have been totally forgotten when Corinth was razed to the ground in 146 B.C. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College ^*^]

Negotiations were held at Nicaea in Locris, but they broke down (Polyb. 18 1-11). One by one, thanks to the expert diplomacy of Flamininus, the allies of Philip dropped away. Sparta, Argos, and Boeotia all saw the writing on the wall. In a major battle at Cynoscephalae, Philip was badly defeated. The credit for the Roman victory went to the hardened veterans of Scipio Africanus. Philip was brought back to Nicaea and this time accepted essentially the terms he had turned down before; he was allowed to remain in power, but was stripped of all territorial claims outside Macedon. Why did Flamininus let this happen, when the Greeks were clamoring to see Macedon utterly destroyed? Probably it was part of his strategy for keeping Antiochus (who had now realized his goal of conquering Egypt) in check. Indeed Antiochus, on hearing the news of Philip's discomfiture, had headed west in hot haste, so that by 196 he was in Thrace and seemingly contemplating a further advance.” ^*^

To complete her work in eastern Europe, and to justify her position as defender of the Greek cities, Rome withdrew her garrisons and announced the independence of Greece. This was proclaimed by Flamininus at the Isthmian games, amid wild enthusiasm and unbounded expressions of gratitude. Rome was hailed as “the nation which, at its own expense, with its own labor, and at its own risk, waged war for the liberty of others, and which had crossed the sea that justice, right, and law should everywhere have sovereign sway” (Livy, xxxiii, 33). [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) \~]

Events Before the Second Macedonian War

After the Peace of Phoenice in 205 B.C., “there was a delicate balance of power in the Greek world. The Achaean League ruled the Peloponnesus with the aid of Antigonus Doson (predecessor of Philip V). On Philip's accession in 221 B.C., Macedon was one of three great powers in the Greek world, the others being Syria and Egypt. Syria was ruled by Antiochus III, heir to the Seleucid dynasty, from 223-187 B.C.. In the years 212-205 B.C. Antigonus managed some conquests in the far east, including a trip to furthest Bactria which went some way to convincing his detractors that he was the new Alexander. Antiochus' major concern, however, was friction with neighbouring Egypt. With the cultural center of the Greek world at Alexandria, Egypt too had broad influence. Upon the death of Ptolemy Philopator, Antiochus and Philip had allied to gobble up Egypt (Polyb. 15.20 and 16.1.). But Philip's attacks on free cities had made this idea unpopular, and strengthened the Egyptian resistance. Another complication was the existing amicitia between Rome and Egypt, which went all the way back to 273 B.C., a consequence of the defeat of Pyrrhus. In 202 B.C. the Aetolian League called on Rome for help against Philip and Antiochus, but the call went unheeded at first. One reason was that Aetolia had made peace with Philip in 206. Notice also that Attalus of Pergamum was calling for Roman intervention alongside his Rhodian allies. However, the Roman reluctance to intervene at this juncture (described by Livy, 31.29) is difficult to reconcile with the active imperialism hypothesis.

“Finally the senate acted in 200 B.C., sending P. Sulpicius Galba to Macedonia as his consular province. But in March of that year the comitia centuriata refused to declare war on Philip, possibly because the case was made out that there were no legal grounds (and only just wars could expect divine sanction). The Senate had to be content for the moment with sending ambassadors to get the lie of the land in Greece (the relative chronology of the embassies and the votes in the comitia is very tortuous). They found Athens (which was also in amicitia with Rome) angry at Philip and his allies in Acarnania. The ambassadors delivered an ultimatum to Philip through his general, Nicanor; but it was ignored. Then in July of 200 B.C. the comitia reversed itself and declared war on Philip, supposedly at the behest of the Athenians. While Philip continued to act aggressively towards Attica, the Roman ambassadors tried unsuccessfully to put pressure on his ally Antiochus.

Romans Take On Antiochus III, Ruler of Syria and the Seleucid Empire.

Antiochos III and Scipio

There was now left in the world only one great power which could claim to be a rival of Rome. That power was Syria, under its ambitious ruler, Antiochus III, 6th ruler of the Seleucid Empire. David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “A number of things led to the conflict between Rome and this great power in Asia. Rome and Flamininus did not deal so well with Antiochus on the diplomatic plane; he wanted the Romans to define the limits of his sphere of influence in Thrace, but they were unwilling or unable to do so. The senatorial treaty of 196 B.C. (ratifying the decision of Flamininus) had carried a not-so-subtle warning to Antiochus: all the Greeks states were to be free, without tribute or garrison, both in Europe and in Asia. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College ^*^]

“Flamininus was probably sincere in wanting to free the Greeks. Certainly the annalists made the most of the occasion of his proclamation (Livy 33.32 and 34.49). But trouble arose over the Roman settlement of the division of Thessaly, which had not been as favorable to the Aetolian League as it might have been, and in the Peloponnesus Flamininus had to stamp out the Spartan king Nabis, who had taken Argos. Still, when Flamininus said no garrison he meant Roman ones too, and in 194 he got his wish; over the protests of the Philhellenic (?) Scipio Africanus, who was in favor of making Greece a consular province, all the Roman forces were withdrawn. ^*^

“In 193-194 B.C. the Romans continued to negotiate with Antiochus to no avail. The Romans were prepared to let Antiochus keep Egypt and the rest of his empire if he got out of Thrace, but this proved unacceptable. In 193 B.C. the Aetolians, who had been dissatisfied with the settlement of 196, invited Antiochus to come in and liberate Greece. Antiochus was willing. He and the Aetolians looked for aid from Philip and from Hannibal, but both were still licking their wounds; in fact Philip had decided that for the moment his interests lay in remaining friends with Rome, and he provided assistance to Rome in the war against Antiochus (short of supplying troops). In Sparta old King Nabis was as ready as ever, though, and he managed to destroy a few towns before Flamininus put him down again in 192. The Aetolians subsequently managed to foment a plot in Sparta to kill Nabis, and also took the stronghold of Demetrias (another of the fetters of Greece).” ^*^

War with Antiochus of Syria (192-189 B.C.)

The direct cause of the War with Antiochus of Syria (192-189 B.C.) grew out of the intrigues of the Aetolians in Greece. This restless people stirred up a discord among the Greek cities, and finally called upon Antiochus to espouse their cause, and to aid them in driving the Romans out of the country. Antiochus accepted this invitation, crossed the Hellespont, and landed in Greece with an army of 10,000 men (192 B.C.). Rome now appeared as the protector of Europe against Asia. She was supported by her previous enemy, Philip of Macedonia; and she was also aided by the kingdom of Pergamum and the republic of Rhodes. [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) \~]

David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “In the fall of 192 B.C. Antiochus was at Demetrias. Probably the most he hoped for was to make a quick show of force in Greece, then to retire on equal terms. But Rome responded with a declaration of war. Antiochus got no support in Greece except from the Aetolians, who had their eyes on Thessaly. In 191 B.C. a Roman army under M. Acilius Glabrio met Antiochus at Thermopylae, and repeated the tactic Xerxes had used in the late summer of 480; the key to the Roman victory was the weakness of the Aetolian contingent guarding the path against an encircling move. Antiochus' army was annihilated in the pass. Antiochus hastily retreated to Asia Minor, whither he was pursued by the Romans. The next few years in Greece saw the troublesome Aetolian League neutralized, bound by a treaty to preserve the empire and maiestas of the Roman people (189 B.C.). This treaty (Polybius 21.32 = SB 69) may be contrasted with the one made between Rome and the Aetolians in 201, when Rome required Aetolian help against Philip. Its relatively harsh terms are said to have been counter to the desires of Flamininus and reflective of the policies of Acilius Glabrio. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College]

The career of Antiochus in Greece was short. After he was defeated by Marcus Porcius Cato in the famous pass of Thermopylae (191 B.C.), and was driven back across the sea into Asia Minor. A Roman fleet chased Antiochus into his home waters, bolstered by alliance with the Rhodians, whose navy was the envy of the Aegean. Why did the Romans take the war with Antiochus into the area of Asia Minor, which had never before been the scene of non-diplomatic Roman intervention? Surely one reason was to gratify Eumenes of Pergamum, who had succeeded to the throne of a very proud tradition (the Attalids) but whose lands and influence had been severely curtailed by the growth of Seleucid power. The Rhodians, whose fleet protected their brisk commerce in the eastern Mediterranean, also advocated putting Antiochus down. Less plausible is the motive adduced by Scullard, that Antiochus was seen as another Hannibal, and the pursuit to Asia Minor was simply the flip side of Scipio Africanus' strategy of taking the war to Hannibal in Africa. I knew Hannibal, Hannibal was a friend of mine, and believe me Antiochus was no Hannibal (á la Lloyd Bentsen); Antiochus posed no direct threat to Rome. Least effective as a motive here is the prospect of economic gain; the Romans were still hesitant about reaping the fruits of their intervention in Greece, and no one in 191 can have been thinking yet in terms of a province of Asia.

Romans Defeat Antiochus of Syria and the Seleucid Empire

David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “A series of naval battles saw the Romans temporarily in command of the seas. Meanwhile a Roman army was marching across Thrace. Its commander was officially L. Scipio, but at his side was his elder brother P. Scipio Africanus, calling the shots. Antiochus tried to negotiate, but the price demanded by the Romans, that he give up most of the Seleucid empire, was too high. The next year the Romans followed him, and fought their first battle upon the continent of Asia. The Roman army was nominally under the command of the new consul, L. Cornelius Scipio, but really under the command of his famous brother, Scipio Africanus, who accompanied him. The decisive battle was fought at Magnesia (190 B.C.), not far from Sardis in western Asia Minor. Forty thousand of the enemy were slain, with a comparatively small loss to the Romans. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College]

At the battle at Magnesia in 190 B.C., the Roman forces were outnumbered over 2 to 1, but despite heavy losses on their left flank to the Persian cavalry the Roman legions made short work of the Syrians in the center and the affair ended in Rome's favor. Had the settlement rested with the Scipios, Antiochus would have been left as a major power in the region and, incidentally, a stabilizing force. But the absence of the Scipios from Rome had exposed them to political attack, and their replacements in Asia Minor imposed such harsh terms upon Antiochus that a power vacuum was created in the Middle East.

After the great victory of Magnesia, Rome turned her arms against the Aetolians, who were so foolish as to continue the struggle. Their chief city, Ambracia, was taken; and they were soon forced to submit. Macedonia and all Greece, with the exception of the Achaean league, were now brought into subjection to the Roman authority. \~\

Reduction of the Seleucid Empire and Outcome of the War with Antiochus

Macedonia and an eastern Mediterranean in 200 BC

Scipio imposed the terms of peace, which required Antiochus: 1) to give up all his possessions in Asia Minor—the most of which were added to the kingdom of Pergamum, with some territory to the republic of Rhodes; 2) to give up his fleet and not to interfere in European affairs; 3) to pay the sum of 15,000 talents (nearly $20,000,000) within twelve years; and 4) to surrender Hannibal, who had taken an active part in the war. [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) \~]

David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “The terms barred Antiochus from military activity west of the Taurus mountain range, effectively ejecting him from most of Turkey. Again, Gruen's method is to divine the original motive from the outcome; after Antiochus was defeated, the Romans parceled out his land between the Rhodians and Eumenes of Pergamum. Rhodes' tenure was destined to be short, however. In the years 169-167 a revolution at Rhodes brought an anti-Roman party to power, and even though the Rhodians tried to make amends after Roman supremacy was demonstrated yet again at Pydna, it was too late. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College ^*^]

“The Romans had demanded a huge indemnity from Antiochus (15,000 talents as against a mere 1000 from Philip in 196 B.C., 10,000 from Carthage in 202 B.C.). Bent on discrediting financial gain as a motive for Roman imperial conquests in this period, Gruen argues that such indemnities had two purposes: a) to reimburse Rome for the costs of the war, and b) to act as a punitive fine. Of course such sums could hardly be paid all at once, and installment schedules were devised. Perhaps it is a bit naive to insist that those who favored hunting Antiochus down so far from Italian soil had completely forgotten the lucrative legacy of the 2nd Punic War. But there is at least one seemingly telling point in Gruen's favor. In 191 B.C., the Carthaginians offered to pay off the balance of their ten thousand talent indemnity in a single lump sum (Livy 36.4); the Senate refused to allow this, which indicates that the symbolic importance of the annual monetary declaration of Carthaginian submission was paramount. Carthage is by any lights a special case, though, and humbling someone like Antiochus can not have been as crucial to Roman pride.

The Fate of Hannibal: To the Romans it seemed an act of treachery that Hannibal, who had been conquered in a fair field at Zama, should continue his hostility by fighting on the side of their enemies. But Hannibal never forgot the oath of eternal enmity to Rome, the oath which he had sworn at his father’s knee. When Antiochus agreed to surrender him, Hannibal fled to Crete, and afterward took refuge with the king of Bithynia. Here he continued his hostility to Rome by aiding this ruler in a war against Rome’s ally, the king of Pergamum. The Romans still pursued him, and sent Flamininus to demand his surrender. But Hannibal again fled, and, hunted from the face of the earth, this great soldier, who had been the most terrible foe that Rome had ever encountered, took his own life by drinking poison. It is said that the year of his death was the same year (183 B.C.) in which died his great and victorious antagonist, Scipio Africanus.” \~\

Silverman wrote: “In 146 B.C., Carthage and Corinth were both utterly destroyed. Macedonia and Africa were now provinces. In 133 Attalus III of Pergamum had died and tried to spare the Romans involvement in a war over his succession (there was no heir) by bequeathing his empire (in his will) to the Roman people. If so he failed, but a brief campaign in 131 and 130 was enough to settle the hash of Aristonicus, a pretender to his throne. The creation of a province of Asia followed in 130. Seleucid power was a thing of the past, and although two Ptolemies (VI and VII) were squabbling over Egypt and its vassals, the Romans simply left them to it. So the east was quiet. In the west, there was ongoing difficulty with the administration of Spain (Numantine War, 143-133), but no major threat prior to the war with Jugurtha (112-106). ^

After the War Against with Syria and the Seleucids, Rome Switches Its Attention Back to Macedonia

The great battles of Cynoscephalae and Magnesia gave Rome had reason to believe that it had broken the power of her rivals in the East. But she had not yet adopted in that part of the world the policy which she had previously employed in the case of Sicily and Spain, namely, of reducing the territory to the condition of provinces. She had left the countries of the East nominally free and independent; and had placed them in the condition of subject allies, or of tributary states. She had compelled them to reduce their armies, to give her an annual tribute, and to promise not to make a war without her consent. In this way she believed that Macedonia and Syria would be obliged to keep the peace. Over the weaker powers, like the Greek cities, the kingdom of Pergamum, and the republic of Rhodes, she had assumed the position of a friendly protector. But in spite of this generous policy, a spirit of discontent gradually grew up in the various countries, and Rome was soon obliged, as we shall see, to adopt a new and more severe policy, in order to maintain peace and order throughout her growing empire. [Source: “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) \~]

David Silverman of Reed College wrote: “While Rome was fighting of Antiochus and afterwards, Philip quietly engaged in rebuilding his strength, aided by the revenues from his gold and silver mines. Livy spends a good deal of time in this period recounting the little tragedy of the conflict between Philip's two sons, Demetrius the friend of Rome and the wily older brother Perseus. For our purposes the kernel is that Demetrius went to Rome as a good-will ambassador and was very successful, managing to build up influence with some powerful senatorial families. Given the new balance of power, and the Senate's fondness for dependable obedient client-kings, Demetrius might hope to parley Roman favour into a seat on the throne of Macedon. Perseus seems to have headed off this prospect by convincing Philip that Demetrius was a traitor, although the truth is hard to recover because Livy reflects a strong bias against Perseus and in favour of Demetrius. In any case Demetrius was executed and Perseus became king on Philip's death. [Source: David Silverman, Classics 373 ~ History 393 Class, Reed College ^*^]

“For the reasons already noted, Perseus is a hard figure to assess. The Romans insisted that he had interfered all over Greece in places where he did not belong, such as at the Pythian games (Panhellenic festivals were traditionally the preferred venue for power diplomacy by the Macedonian Kings). Even worse, they said he plotted to murder the Roman Senate and enslave all the cities of Greece. Perseus' real sin, though, was playing the demagogue for the disgruntled debtors of mainland Greece, who were being squeezed by an economic depression; his agenda of redistribution of wealth and cancellation of debts was anathema to the Romans. The Romans were scarcely concerned to impose their brand of government upon their allies; even annexed provinces were permitted in large part to maintain their native governmental institutions at the municipal level. But advocating this sort of social upheaval, as we will see graphically next week, was guaranteed to arouse the senatorial ire. ^*^

“By 171 Rome had drifted into a declaration of war against Perseus (the 3rd Macedonian War, 171-167). The reaction of the Greeks gives the lie to much of the Roman demonization of Perseus; though they did not see Perseus as a liberator, very few actively supported the Roman campaign against him. Part of this, however, was due to certain excesses perpetrated by Roman generals in Greece in the 170s; the novelty of Flamininus' declaration of freedom was wearing off. One reason for the Roman anxiety over Perseus has already been mentioned; another, perhaps of equal importance, was once again the vociferous advocacy of Eumenes, who may have had a personal grudge. It is alleged that Perseus tried to kill him (cf. SB 73). Certainly Eumenes also believed that a resurgent Macedon would one day threaten his recently acquired territories in Asia Minor, on the theory that every Macedonian King longed to follow in the footsteps of Alexander. The consul L. Aemilius Paullus made short work of Perseus' pikemen, inflicting a crushing defeat in a pitched battle at Pydna in 167. ^*^

“Again, it may be possible to address the question of imperialistic motives by going backwards from the settlement. On the one hand, the Romans withdrew yet again from northern Greece and declined to make Macedonia a province. That would not happen until 148, when a pretender named Andriscus tried to revive Macedonian power by passing himself off as a son of Perseus. On this occasion Macedon was broken up into four pieces, and her gold and silver mines were closed down. The latter action has been taken to indicate the absence of economic imperialism as a motive for crushing Perseus. More realistically, the Romans closed the mines as a preventative measure, so that it would be more difficult to fund a resurgence of Macedonian power. Here we find a startling episode which supports the Harris hypothesis of active imperialism. Acting on the authority of the senate, the victorious Aemilius Paullus sacked 70 cities of Epirus, producing a vast haul of booty for the troops and (more importantly) 150,000 slaves for the Italian latifundia (plantations). See Polybius 30.15, Livy 45. 33-34 = SB 75. Episodes such as this are inconvenient for Gruen, who is reduced to an arguably specious distinction between such windfalls interpreted as motives for war and as merely the icing on the cake. Would he like some cake with that icing?” ^

Macedonia and Asia Minor in 188 BC

Image Sources: Wikimedia Commons

Text Sources: Internet Ancient History Sourcebook: Rome sourcebooks.fordham.edu ; Internet Ancient History Sourcebook: Late Antiquity sourcebooks.fordham.edu ; “Outlines of Roman History” by William C. Morey, Ph.D., D.C.L. New York, American Book Company (1901) ; “The Private Life of the Romans” by Harold Whetstone Johnston, Revised by Mary Johnston, Scott, Foresman and Company (1903, 1932); BBC Ancient Rome bbc.co.uk/history/ ; Project Gutenberg gutenberg.org ; Metropolitan Museum of Art, National Geographic, Smithsonian magazine, New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Live Science, Discover magazine, Archaeology magazine, Reuters, Associated Press, The Guardian, AFP, The New Yorker, Wikipedia, Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopedia.com and various other books, websites and publications.

Last updated October 2024